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From the Three Natures to 
the¬Two¬Natures
On a Fluid Approach to the Two Versions of  
Other-Emptiness from Fifteenth-Century Tibet
Yaroslav Komarovski
University of Nebraska Lincoln
Iໍ ༬ෞයෞໍཋ ྞෞ೻༬༼ ཋ฾ෞ༬ෞ ฾೻༼ been a surge of scholarly interest in diverse 
systems of Buddhist thought and practice that Tibetan thinkers charac-
terize as “other-emptiness” (gzhan stong), contrasting them with systems of 
“self-emptiness” (rang stong). While the theories of such exponents of other-
emptiness as Dölpopa Sherap Gyeltsen (dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan, 
1292–1361)1 are relatively well known, those of other Tibetan thinkers are 
only beginning to receive scholarly attention. This paper addresses one 
such lesser-known other-emptiness theory that was developed by the 
seminal Tibetan thinker Serdok Penchen Shakya Chokden (gser mdog paذ 
chen shčkya mchog ldan, 1428–1507).
Shakya Chokden articulated his position on other-emptiness in works 
written during the last thirty years of his life. In those works he advocated 
both AlҮkčkčravčda Yogčcčra and Niьsvabhčvavčda Madhyamaka systems 
as equally valid forms of Madhyamaka, regarding the former as a system 
of other-emptiness and the latter as a system of self-emptiness.2 Instead of 
approaching the two systems as irreconcilable, he presented them as equally 
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valid and eϱective, emphasized their respective strengths, and promoted one 
or the other depending on context and audience. Partly for these reasons, 
his own philosophical outlook does not neatly fall into the categories of 
other-emptiness or self-emptiness, and placing him squarely into the camp 
of “followers of other-emptiness” (gzhan stong pa)—as some advocates of 
later sectarian traditions did—does not do justice to him as a thinker.3
According to Shakya Chokden, virtually all seminal Yogčcčra 
authors, such as Maitreya, Asaثga, and Vasubandhu, as well as leading 
Buddhist logicians, such as Dignčga and DharmakҮrti, were adherents of 
AlҮkčkčravčda and, by extension, proponents of other-emptiness. This 
assessment follows from his understanding of the distinction between 
the two Yogčcčra systems—Satyčkčravčda and AlҮkčkčravčda—that ulti-
mately boils down to the question of the reality of mental appearances. In 
Shakya Chokden’s opinion, although Yogčcčras in general do not accept 
the existence of an external material world, according to Satyčkčravčda 
its appearances or “representations” (rnam pa, čkčra) ref lected in 
consciousness have a real or true existence, because they are of one 
nature with the really existent consciousness, their creator. According to 
AlҮkčkčravčda, neither external phenomena nor their appearances and 
consciousnesses that reflect them really exist. What exists in reality is 
only primordial mind (ye shes, jñčna).4 Because only this latter position 
represents the final Yogčcčra view, according to Shakya Chokden, to 
claim that any key Yogčcčra thinker was a follower of Satyčkčravčda 
would entail that he did not fully understand the final view of the 
Yogčcčra system.5
While presenting the ϧnal view of reality held by key Yogčcčra thinkers 
as identical, Shakya Chokden was also aware that they were far from 
being unanimous in their approaches to that view. He found two diϱerent 
versions of that view in Yogčcčra works, but insisted that both versions 
are valid and do not contradict each other. Consequently, he himself did 
not interpret the view of other-emptiness in one way only, but shifted 
focus depending on what materials he was addressing. In the process, 
he articulated a provocative approach to the three natures (ngo bo nyid 
gsum, trisvabhčva)—the key Yogčcčra categories involved in its teachings 
on reality—thereby contributing to our understanding of the diversity of 
Yogčcčra theories and their interpretations in subsequent commentarial 
literature.
Discussion of speciϧc details of those theories and their comparison with 
Shakya Chokden’s views are beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, 
one important feature of Yogčcčra writings should be mentioned. As is well 
known to contemporary scholars, Indian Yogčcčra texts are far from being 
unanimous in their interpretations even of such key teachings as the three 
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natures, allowing for multiple interpretations of those teachings by South 
and East Asian commentators.6 Tibetans were very well aware of those 
diverse positions, as well as the apparently conϩicting statements found at 
times even in the same text. In their attempts to discern a deeper meaning 
underlying that diversity (paint a coherent picture of Yogčcčra thought and 
place it into the broader context of Mahčyčna Buddhism), such thinkers 
as Tsongkhapa Lopzang Drakpa (tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419) 
and Dölpopa developed competing and highly ingenious commentarial 
systems.7 Shakya Chokden’s interpretation of other-emptiness, too, was 
formed in response to divergent positions contained in Yogčcčra writings, 
in particular, those dealing with the three natures. Let us now turn to his 
interpretation of those positions.
In his Rain of Ambrosia, Shakya Chokden describes two diϱerent versions 
of other-emptiness articulated in Yogčcčra writings:
There emerged two dissimilar [approaches] regarding the mode of 
identifying the subject-basis of other-emptiness. In the Yogčcčra texts, 
the reality, [understood as] the basis of emptiness, the dependent, being 
empty of the object of negation, the imaginary, is explained as the 
thoroughly established. In the Sublime Continuum and the Conquest over 
Objections about the [Three] Mother Scriptures, the reality, the thoroughly 
established, is explained as empty of the imaginary. [These] two also 
[stem] from [interpretive] diϱerences: including all knowables into two, 
the imaginary and thoroughly established, or dividing them into three: 
[the imaginary, thoroughly established] and dependent. They are not 
contradictory.8
As this passage demonstrates, Shakya Chokden traces the two inter-
pretations of other-emptiness to two different sets of texts. One is 
found in Yogčcčra texts other than Maitreya’s Sublime Continuum of 
Mahčyčna and Asaثga’s Explanation of [Maitreya’s] ‘Sublime Continuum 
of Mahčyčna’.9 The other is found in these two texts as well as in the 
Conquest over Objections about the [Three] Mother Scriptures attributed to 
Vasubandhu.10 Note that according to Shakya Chokden’s overall position 
articulated in such texts as the Rain of Ambrosia, all the “Five Dharmas 
of Maitreya”—including the Sublime Continuum and its commentary by 
Asaثga—are Madhyamaka works of other-emptiness.11 Thus, the passage 
should not be taken as implying that Yogčcčra works contain only the 
former approach.
The passage argues that the main difference between the two 
approaches lies in dissimilar identiϧcations of the basis of emptiness 
(stong gzhi) or the subject-basis of other-emptiness (gzhan stong gi gzhi 
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chos can). This¬diϱerence is dictated by two dissimilar contexts: division 
of all phenomena into the three natures (ngo bo nyid, svabhčva) or the 
two natures. The ϧrst approach is a well-known Yogčcčra position: the 
dependent (gzhan dbang, paratantra) is taken as the basis of emptiness, 
the imaginary (kun btags / kun brtags, parikalpita) is negated on that basis, 
and that negation is explained as the thoroughly established (yongs grub, 
parini߅panna). According to the second approach, the thoroughly estab-
lished itself is taken as the basis of emptiness and explained as empty of 
the imaginary. Despite these diϱerences, Shakya Chokden does not see the 
two approaches as contradictory.
The Rain of Ambrosia points out that in the Sublime Continuum and 
its commentary by Asaثga, the subject-basis of emptiness is explained as 
the reality-limit (yang dag pa’i mtha’, bh࠭tako߮i), that is, ultimate reality, 
in contrast to other Yogčcčra texts where the subject-basis of emptiness 
is explained as the dependent. According to Shakya Chokden, Asaثga 
interpreted other-emptiness diϱerently in his commentary on the Sublime 
Continuum and the Summary of Higher Knowledge.12 Among other diϱer-
ences, in the commentary on the Sublime Continuum he did not explain 
the three characteristics (mtshan nyid gsum, trilak߅aذa), that is, the three 
natures. These interpretive diϱerences, Shakya Chokden argues, stem from 
the diϱerent s࠭tras explored in those texts.13
While there are many Yogčcčra texts utilizing the terminology of the 
three natures, the Sublime Continuum and its commentary by Asaثga 
mention neither the imaginary and thoroughly established pair nor the 
whole trio. Shakya Chokden was no doubt aware of this because he 
commented on the Sublime Continuum separately14 and also referred to 
diϱerent passages from the text in many other works. Therefore, the 
above reference to the two natures in the Sublime Continuum should not 
be understood in terms of those categories per se but rather in terms of 
the translation of the Sublime Continuum’s approach into those categories. 
When the Sublime Continuum’s basic position that the ultimate is empty of 
adventitious phenomena is translated into the Yogčcčra categories of the 
three natures, the ultimate can be treated only as the thoroughly estab-
lished, while adventitious, conventional phenomena have to be subsumed 
under the category of the imaginary.
What makes such translation possible in the first place is Shakya 
Chokden’s basic claim that all major Yogčcčra thinkers hold the same view 
of reality and only use diϱerent terms and categories for approaching it. 
Shakya Chokden also shared the broader Tibetan perspective on Buddhist 
philosophical systems: regardless of which system one deals with, it should 
be possible to classify all phenomena into two realities or truths: ultimate 
truth (don dam bden pa, paramčrthasatya) and relative truth (kun rdzob 
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bden pa, samvގtisatya). Tibetan thinkers generally tend to subsume the 
imaginary and dependent under the category of relative truth. Shakya 
Chokden goes further and splits the dependent into two parts—the imagi-
nary and thoroughly established—that are in turn equated with the relative 
and ultimate truths respectively.
Shakya Chokden’s understanding of the nature of the two truths also 
plays an important role in his interpretation of the three natures. His 
basic position is that if something exists, it has to exist really and truly, 
exist as reality and truth. Because relative truth does not exist truly, it 
does not exist (although it appears to exist to deluded minds).15 Translated 
into the language of the three natures, it means that only the thoroughly 
established exists—nothing else. Consequently, divisions of relative 
phenomena—including those of the other two natures—are diϱerent types 
of nonexistence, not existence. From this perspective, diϱerences between 
the dependent and the imaginary, respectively, are similar to those between 
dreams and dreams within dreams—neither of them exist from the point 
of view of the wakeful state.
In order to understand how Shakya Chokden came up with this approach 
we must take a closer look at his interpretation of the three natures. 
We will then give special attention to the dependent that is clearly the 
most pivotal (literally and metaphorically) and ambiguous of the three 
natures: while the other two natures are retained in both theories of other- 
emptiness, it appears in the three natures theory but disappears in the two 
natures theory.
Shakya Chokden addresses the three natures in many texts scattered 
throughout the twenty-four volumes of his collected writings. Among those 
works, especially helpful for our task is his Enjoyment Ocean of Scriptural 
Statements and Reasoning, which provides very clear and succinct deϧni-
tions and divisions of the three natures.16 In its presentation of the three 
natures, that text refers to such diverse sources as Asaثga’s Summary of 
Mahčyčna,17 Maitreya’s Diϱerentiation of the Middle and Extremes,18 and 
Vasubandhu’s Thirty Stanzas,19 clearly treating them as sharing the same 
view and complementing each other.
The text gives the following deϧnition of the imaginary: “that which 
appears—but is not established as it appears—to knowing dualistically 
appearing as apprehended and apprehender due to predispositions.”20 
Among its diϱerent divisions, the one that is relevant for the foregoing 
discussion is the division into the apprehended-imaginary (gzung ba kun 
btags) and the apprehender-imaginary (’dzin pa kun btags).21
The definition of the dependent is: “‘cognition that—due to 
 predispositions—dualistically appears as apprehended and apprehender,’ 
or ‘cognition that—due to those [predispositions]—appears as having 
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representations of the three realms.’”22 Among its diϱerent divisions, 
the one that is relevant for the foregoing discussion is the division into 
the dependent with the characteristics of the apprehended and with the 
characteristics of the apprehender (gzung dang ’dzin pa’i mtshan nyid 
can), which are respectively the dependent appearing as objects, etc., 
and the dependent appearing as conceptual minds, etc., apprehending 
those objects.23 Note that according to Shakya Chokden, all types of the 
dependent are created by the power of the predispositions of dualistic 
appearances. He therefore rejects its division into the pure dependent and 
the impure dependent (dag pa’i gzhan dbang and ma dag pa’i gzhan dbang, 
respectively) advocated by some thinkers.24 Arguing that no pure dependent 
is possible, he eϱectively rejects the possibility of the dependent becoming 
the thoroughly established either prior to or after the realization of the 
latter has taken place (more on this below).
Shakya Chokden deϧnes the thoroughly established as “suchness which 
is empty of the imaginary on the basis of the subject [of emptiness], the 
dependent” (chos can gzhan dbang gi steng du kun tu btags pas stong pa’i 
de bzhin nyid). It is divided into the unchangeable thoroughly established 
(’gyur ba med pa’i yongs grub), which is the factor of experience, clarity, 
and cognition characterized by the negation of the imaginary (de bkag pas 
khyad par du byas pa’i myong ba gsal rig gi cha), and the non-erroneous 
thoroughly established (phyin ci ma log pa’i yongs grub), which is the 
primordial mind of the meditative equipoise of čryas that directly real-
izes that unchangeable thoroughly established (de mngon sum du rtogs pa’i 
’phags pa’i mnyam gzhag ye shes). Note that in the above deϧnition of the 
thoroughly established Shakya Chokden places emphasis on suchness, to 
wit, primordial mind, which is empty of the imaginary. Nevertheless, the 
dependent is retained as the basis of that emptiness. We will return to 
this point when discussing the relationship between the two approaches 
to other-emptiness.
Shakya Chokden’s interpretation of the three natures allows for a few 
overlaps. First, the two divisions of the thoroughly established overlap: in 
the context of meditative equipoise of Mahčyčna čryas, the non-erroneous 
thoroughly established and the unchangeable thoroughly established have 
the same nature: experience, clarity, and cognition characterized by the 
negation of the imaginary are inseparable characteristics of the primordial 
mind of the meditative equipoise of čryas.25 Second, the imaginary and 
dependent overlap among themselves: the apprehender-imaginary has the 
same nature as consciousness that projects dualistic appearances. This 
being said, no overlap is possible between the dependent and thoroughly 
established. I will address these two latter points below, when elaborating 
on the ambiguous status of the dependent.
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In the Great Path of Ambrosia of Emptiness, Shakya Chokden presents 
further details of the other-emptiness mode of relationship between the 
three natures:
The basis that is empty is the dependent: all knowing that has dualistic 
appearance of the apprehended and apprehender (gzung ’dzin gnyis snang 
can gyi shes pa). The object of negation is the imaginary. It is of two 
types, due to the division into the apprehended (gzung ba, grčhya) and 
the apprehender (’dzin pa, grčhaka). Each of these two, the apprehended 
and apprehender, also has two [subdivisions]: in terms of persons and 
in terms of phenomena«.The way in which [phenomena] are empty is 
[as follows:] the basis of negation is empty of the object of negation in 
terms of other-emptiness, not in terms of self-emptiness. This is because 
in relation to the bases of negation, i.e., the two types of dualistically 
appearing knowing (gnyis snang gi shes pa), the objects of negation, i.e., 
the two types of apprehended and apprehender, are other entities (gzhan 
gyi ngo bo); they are not posited as the own entities (rang gyi ngo bo) of 
those [bases of negation].26
From this perspective of other-emptiness, the dependent, namely, 
consciousnesses with dualistic appearances, is taken as the basis of empti-
ness/basis of negation. The imaginary, that is, all dualistic appearances of 
persons and phenomena appearing as objects and subjects apprehending 
those objects, is taken as the object of negation. In other words, conscious-
nesses with dualistic appearances both appear as the imaginary and are 
empty of it at the same time. In this approach, the nonexistent entity of the 
imaginary is posited as diϱerent from—or other than—the existent entity 
of the dependent. This is the theory of other-emptiness, because it treats 
the entities of the basis of negation and the object of negation as diϱerent. 
(Shakya Chokden contrasts this position with the self-emptiness approach 
that takes the basis of negation and the object of negation as the same, 
treating all phenomena as being empty of themselves.)27
Note that the above passage also suggests an overlap between the 
dependent and imaginary: mind that has dualistic appearances of the 
apprehended and apprehender is none other than the apprehender. As 
Shakya Chokden puts it in the Rain of Ambrosia: “[T]he word ‘apprehender’ 
is explained as [referring] to that very mind which appears as the appre-
hended and apprehends that [appearance].”28 Further citations from Shakya 
Chokden’s works below will clarify this point.
But if the dualistically appearing consciousness is both the dependent 
and imaginary, then how can the dependent be empty of the imaginary in 
terms of other-emptiness and not self-emptiness, how can the dependent 
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and imaginary have diϱerent entities, and ϧnally, what is the “own entity” 
of the dependent? To answer these questions, we have to take a closer look 
at Shakya Chokden’s interpretation of the dependent in the AlҮkčkčravčda 
system.
In contrast to the other two natures—the thoroughly established that 
ultimately exists and the imaginary that does not exist at all (although like 
an illusion, it appears to exist)—the dependent has neither an independent 
existence nor, for that matter, an independent nonexistence. In other words, 
it is nothing more than a provisional conglomerate of the other two natures 
with no separate entity of its own. Shakya Chokden explains this point 
in the Ocean of Scriptural Statements and Reasoning where, invoking the 
authority of Asaثga’s Summary of Mahčyčna, he writes that the dependent 
“belongs to both parts” (gnyis ka’i char gtogs), being comprised of the 
imaginary and thoroughly established. The part of dualistic appearance 
(gnyis snang gi cha) of the dependent is subsumed under the imaginary, 
while its part of clarity and cognition (gsal rig gi cha) is subsumed under 
the thoroughly established. By itself, the dependent does not have a sepa-
rate entity:
In the Summary of Mahčyčna too, having explained that the dependent 
“belongs to both parts,” [Asaثga further] explained that [its] part of 
dualistic appearance is subsumed under the imaginary, while its part 
of clarity and cognition is subsumed under the thoroughly established. 
Apart from those two, [the dependent itself] was not taught [by Asaثga] 
as truly established.29
The Summary of Mahčyčna passage that Shakya Chokden is referring to 
goes as follows: “The imaginary nature present in the dependent nature 
belongs to the thoroughly aϮicted part. The thoroughly established nature 
present [in the dependent nature] belongs to the puriϧed part. As for the 
dependent itself, it belongs to both parts.”30
Note that Shakya Chokden is not arguing that the dependent exists even 
though it does not exist truly. Rather, he argues that apart from the other 
two natures the dependent does not exist at all. This point is made clear 
by the following passage from the Snatching Away the Heart’s Torments, 
where he explains that according to AlҮkčkčravčda, both the apprehended 
and apprehender are the imaginary, only nondual primordial mind is the 
ultimate, and no dependent can be identiϧed apart from them:
On the level of the ϧnal tenets of Yogčcčra texts
Both the apprehended and apprehender are [treated as] the imaginary part,
And only non-dual primordial mind is [treated as] the ultimate.
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If not a single dependent can be identiϧed apart from those,
What is a chance [for it to be] truly existent?31
In the Answers to Three Universally Known Questions he also writes:
As for the dependent, it is determined as [being splittable] into two parts: 
the part of mistaken dualistic appearance and the part of experience, 
clarity, and cognition. The ϧrst one is called the “apprehender-imaginary,” 
while the second is subsumed under the thoroughly established. This is 
why, as it has been explained in the Summary of Mahčyčna, no dependent 
exists apart from the thoroughly established.32
The statement that the dependent does not exist apart from the thor-
oughly established should not be read as implying that the former can be 
subsumed under or overlaps with the latter. On the contrary, it means that 
the only real part of the dependent—clarity and cognition—is the thor-
oughly established, not the dependent. As Shakya Chokden puts it in the 
Appearance of the Sun, “The clarity and cognition part has been explained 
as the thoroughly established; [it] is not explained as the dependent.”33
Although the dependent is comprised of the other two natures, it is 
posited primarily in terms of the imaginary. From the Ocean of Scriptural 
Statements and Reasoning:
The main [feature] of the dependent is posited in terms of [its] part of 
stains of dualistic appearances. It is not posited in terms of the part of 
[its] entity—clarity and cognition. This is because that very [part] is the 
main [feature] of the thoroughly established.34
In other words, because clarity and cognition are the key characteristics 
of the thoroughly established they cannot be used to posit the depen-
dent. Dualistic appearances, on the other hand, are taken as the deϧning 
characteristics of the dependent although, as we already know, they are 
the primary characteristics of the imaginary too. This relates to a point 
made earlier: that the dependent overlaps with the imaginary but not with 
the thoroughly established. The former overlap is possible and the latter 
impossible because both the imaginary and the dependent are produced by 
the power of predispositions of dualistic appearances, while the thoroughly 
established is not. Thus, although the two parts that comprise the depen-
dent are subsumed under—or in fact are—either of the other two natures, 
the dependent overlaps only with the imaginary.
But if the dependent does not have a separate existence, how can it have 
its own entity which is diϱerent from the imaginary? The answer to this 
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question, paradoxical as it is, is that the entity of the dependent is not the 
dependent. As Shakya Chokden puts it in the Snatching Away the Heart’s 
Torments,
Although the entity of the dependent is accepted,
Its entity is not it«35
Although the dependent does not have a separate existence apart from the 
other two natures, and although it does not truly exist, it does have an 
entity that is truly existent. That truly existent entity is none other than 
primordial mind, the thoroughly established. From the Ocean of Scriptural 
Statements and Reasoning:
The explanation of the entity of the dependent as truly established does 
not establish that very [dependent itself] as truly established. This is 
because its ultimate entity does not transcend the thoroughly established.36
This position allows for the dependent to be unreal but exist by nature and 
have a truly existent entity. Because the two natures’ entities are diϱerent, 
it also allows for the dependent to be empty of the imaginary nature in 
terms of other-emptiness, not self-emptiness.
According to Shakya Chokden, the position that having a real or ultimate 
entity or nature does not entail being itself real or ultimate is similar to 
that of proponents of self-emptiness, who explain the emptiness of a pot 
as the ultimate nature or reality of a pot, but do not accept the pot itself 
as ultimate reality. He refers to this approach as an example in order to 
reiterate his position in the Yogčcčra context. From the Rain of Ambrosia:
The dependent being truly established is not a tenet of honorable Asaثga, 
because in his texts that [dependent] was explained as [being] like an illu-
sion. That [dependent] does not become truly established [simply] because 
its entity was explained as truth. This is like the case of explaining the 
entity of a pot, etc., as reality [while not accepting a pot, etc., as reality].37
Shakya Chokden assigns this position paramount importance for under-
standing the view of other-emptiness, writing in the Great Path of Ambrosia 
of Emptiness:
[T]he non-contradictory explanation of the dependent as existent by 
nature and [at the same time] being truthless like an illusion should be 
understood as the key that opens the [treasury of] thatness of the texts of 
proponents of other-emptiness.38
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He further argues that as long as one accepts the dependent as truly 
 established, one has no chance to aϫrm the emptiness of the apprehended/
apprehender duality. Without that, in turn, one cannot access the essence 
of the ϧnal deϧnitive meaning of the ocean of Yogčcčras’ texts (rnal 
’byor spyod gzhung rgya mtsho yi nges don mthar thug snying po)39—the 
AlҮkčkčravčda view of reality.40 To fully understand it, one has to realize 
that the dependent is like an illusion in its not being truly established.
Despite its illusory nature, Shakya Chokden strongly objects to the inter-
pretation of the dependent as self-empty. From the Great Path of Ambrosia 
of Emptiness:
[T]here is no proof and there are factors damaging to the description 
of the dependent in terms of self-emptiness. There is no proof, because 
no such explanation is given in those scriptures [of Asaثga, Maitreya, 
and others]. Damaging factors exist: if the entity of the dependent were 
not truly established, the entity of the thoroughly established, reality, 
would not be truly existent. This is because thatness free from duality of 
apprehended and apprehender (gzung ’dzin gnyis med kyi de kho na nyid) 
is asserted as the entity of dualistically appearing knowing (gnyis snang gi 
shes pa’i ngo bo). That [thatness] is explained as the entity of that [dual-
istically appearing knowing] by the text [of DharmakҮrti’s Commentary 
on Valid Cognition: “Thus,] that [emptiness of duality] is the thatness 
of¬that.”41
In this passage Shakya Chokden argues that although dualistically 
appearing minds are unreal, nevertheless they are not lacking their own 
entity or nature. This is because their own entity is not themselves, but 
the thoroughly established. Therefore, to treat them as self-empty in this 
context would imply the nonexistence of their entity, which in turn would 
imply the nonexistence of the thoroughly established. This is why the 
dependent cannot be treated as self-empty.
What is the nature of relationship between the dualistically appearing 
consciousness and its entity described as the thoroughly established, and 
why does Shakya Chokden insist so strongly on their separation? The 
following passage from his commentary on the Sublime Continuum, the 
Previously Unseen Sun, provides the answers:
Every phenomenon of a mistaken consciousness has the factor of the 
inward-looking primordial mind [related with it]. Nevertheless, it is 
impossible for the clarity factor of primordial mind (ye shes kyi gsal 
cha) to become the entity of consciousness, and it is also impossible 
for that [entity of consciousness] to become that [clarity factor of 
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primordial mind]. Otherwise, it would follow that primordial mind is 
an experiencer of worldly pleasures and suϱerings. [Also,] it would 
follow that those unreal ideations (yang dag pa ma yin pa’i kun tu rtog pa, 
abh࠭taparikalpa) that bear the name of consciousness, are the very basis 
of  accomplishment of all stainless positive qualities. Without that original 
primordial mind (gdod ma’i ye shes), adventitious consciousness (blo bur 
gyi rnam shes) does not emerge as mistaken appearances. Nevertheless, 
the possibility of a common locus (gzhi mthun) of the two is not asserted. 
[Rather, they are] similar to clouds in the sky, oxide on gold, and dirt 
in pure water.42
As this passage makes clear, Shakya Chokden does not want to allow any 
overlap between—or mixture of—primordial mind and dualistic conscious-
ness. Rather, he argues that the two exist side by side as two polarities 
that never mix to assume the same nature. Clouds and sky never become 
one, nor rust and gold, nor even dirt and water. They can coexist, but can 
never completely blend.
Note that in this passage Shakya Chokden says that the clarity factor of 
primordial mind cannot become or turn into the entity of consciousness 
while, as pointed out earlier, he also argues that the thoroughly established 
is the entity of the dependent. The two statements should not be taken as 
contradictory, because one is meant to indicate that the two natures cannot 
become a single entity (hence the notion of a common locus in the above 
passage), while the other indicates that one nature has or possesses the 
other nature without the two becoming one (hence the earlier notion that 
the entity of the dependent is not the dependent).
But if primordial mind and dualistically appearing consciousness do 
not assume each other’s nature, while the factors of clarity and cognition 
are exclusive qualities of primordial mind only, then will it not follow that 
dualistic consciousness lacks these two key characteristics—clarity and 
cognition—and therefore is not diϱerent from inanimate matter? Shakya 
Chokden provides a truly striking answer to this question, which sheds 
more light on his ϩuid approach to other-emptiness:
Objection: If consciousness’s own entity is not accepted as clarity and 
cognition, then it will not cognize objects because of [having absurdly 
turned into inanimate] matter.
Answer: No [such] absurd consequence will apply [here]: in general, it is 
accepted that although consciousness is not established by valid cognition, 
because of a mistake it is only superimposed as existent. It is not accepted 
even as existent—how much less a cognition—precisely because it is a 
relative truth.43
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Shakya Chokden makes it clear that similar to the dualistic appearances it 
produces, dualistically appearing consciousness does not exist. It does not 
exist because it is a relative truth. Only ultimate truth, nondual primordial 
mind exists. If dualistic consciousness existed, then without the qualities 
of clarity and cognition it would indeed become an inanimate matter. 
Nevertheless, since it does not exist, the question whether it is clear and 
cognizing simply does not apply. In the end we are left with only one 
existent thing: primordial mind. Nothing else exists.
This position helps answer the question of why Shakya Chokden treats 
the two approaches to other-emptiness as noncontradictory. The main 
reason is that although the dependent is not self-empty, and although it is 
used as the basis of negation of the imaginary, when the latter has been 
negated on its basis, it does not remain either. From the Rain of Ambrosia:
[AlҮkčkčravčda] Yogčcčras explain that the imaginary is empty of its own 
entity, the dependent is empty of other entities, and what is left in remainder 
of that [emptiness] as not being empty of one’s own entity is that very entity 
of the dependent which is otherwise called the “thoroughly established.” 
Or, in other words, they explain that the subject-basis of emptiness is the 
dependent, the object of negation of which it is empty is the imaginary, and 
the phenomenon [which is characterized as] that subject [of emptiness] 
being empty of that object of negation is the thoroughly established.44
This passage reiterates Shakya Chokden’s basic position that in the 
AlҮkčkčravčda system the dependent is used as the subject-basis of empti-
ness and that it is empty of the imaginary in terms of other-emptiness, not 
self-emptiness. But it also demonstrates that not only the imaginary but 
the dependent too has to go in the process of negation: what is left as the 
remainder of negation is not the dependent per se but only its entity—the 
thoroughly established.
Thus, not only is the dependent a conglomerate of the other two 
natures, but it is also a provisional or temporary conglomerate. Shakya 
Chokden clearly treats it as a vehicle that transports the mind to the 
cosmic expanse of the ultimate view, but is itself shattered into pieces 
when the final AlҮkčkčravčda view is realized. The dependent is impor-
tant as the basis of emptiness—the basis on which the imaginary is 
negated. Nevertheless, when as a result of that negation one has reached 
the final view of reality—the thoroughly established—then the dependent 
also has to go, together with the imaginary. In that state the dualistic 
appearances of apprehended and apprehender disappear and only the 
clarity and cognition  characterized by negation of those appearances 
remain.
From the Three Natures to the¬Two¬Natures  91
Illusory and provisional as it is, the dependent is needed as a starting 
point in the process of realizing emptiness. Were the thoroughly established 
taken as the basis of emptiness from the start, its realization would be 
impossible in the Yogčcčra system as Shakya Chokden understands it. From 
the Great Path of Ambrosia of Emptiness:
[The thoroughly established] is not posited as a subject-basis of emptiness, 
because there is no proof and there are factors damaging to it. There is 
no proof, because [valid] scriptures providing such explanation do not 
exist. The damaging factors are as follows: if the reasoning establishing 
emptiness had to establish the thoroughly established [taken as] the 
subject[-basis of emptiness], as being empty of [both] the imaginary and 
dependent [taken as] negated phenomena, it would follow that at the 
time of ascertaining the subject-basis for dispute (rtsod gzhi’i chos can), 
the¬probandum (bsgrub bya, sčdhya) would have been proved. Otherwise, 
there could exist a correct syllogism that establishes the probandum 
without [initially] ascertaining the subject-basis for dispute.45
Because in the process of determining emptiness through reasoning the 
subject-basis for dispute has to be ascertained before the mechanism of 
a correct syllogism is triggered and its probandum is proved, it is wrong 
to treat the thoroughly established as empty of the other two natures. 
Were it taken as the subject-basis for dispute about whether the thoroughly 
established is empty of the other two natures, then the probandum, “the 
thoroughly established is empty of the other two natures,” would be 
ascertained at the same moment that the subject-basis for dispute was 
ascertained. The syllogism would simply prove what had already been 
ascertained, and therefore would be defective.
Note that the context in which Shakya Chokden insists on retaining 
the dependent as the basis of emptiness is that of positing emptiness 
through reasoning. It is in this context that the dependent is needed 
as the basis of negation. Nevertheless, the process of realizing empti-
ness does not stop there, but continues to eventually culminate in the 
realization of ultimate reality in the meditative equipoise of čryas. It is 
in this context that one directly realizes the thoroughly established, the 
self-illuminating and self-cognizing primordial mind. It is described in 
the Profound Thunder Amidst the Clouds of the Ocean of Definitive Meaning 
as follows:
Honorable Asaثga explained as the deϧnitive meaning of the [last] two 
dharmacakras
The non-dual primordial mind free from all proliferations,
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The self-illuminating self-cognition,
The ϧnal ultimate [truth], the “Buddha-essence.”46
Not only is this primordial mind empty of all conventional phenomena, 
not only is it nonconceptual, but it is also the only phenomenon that can 
cognize primordial mind. In other words, it is self-cognizing.47
Going all the way back to the ϧrst citation in this paper, I should also 
point out that the meaning of the term subject-basis of other-emptiness 
changes depending on whether it is applied to the ϧrst or the second 
approach to other-emptiness articulated by Shakya Chokden. In the context 
of determining emptiness through reasoning, it is the basis upon which 
one negates the object of negation. Therefore, it is diϱerent from empti-
ness that is realized through that process. In the context of subsequent 
realization of emptiness triggered by that process it is the emptiness itself, 
the thoroughly established. That primordial mind—which is left as the 
remainder of negation of the imaginary on the basis of the dependent—is 
the basis of emptiness in terms of being an empty basis, the basis that is 
emptied of everything else.
The forgoing discussion explains why in diϱerent statements scattered 
throughout his works Shakya Chokden sometimes articulates the three 
natures approach and sometimes the two natures approach. He adopts one 
position or the other depending on which elements in the process of real-
ization of reality he wants to emphasize. From the broader perspective of 
his interpretation of the Yogčcčra system, not only are the two approaches 
not contradictory, but they actually complement each other.48 One approach 
pertains to positing emptiness through reasoning and unpacking details 
of the process of reaching the ultimate. The other pertains to the level of 
realization of the ultimate in the meditative equipoise of čryas.
The former approach is articulated, among others, by the following 
statement from the Rain of Ambrosia:
[AlҮkčkčravčda] Yogčcčras explain that the deϧnitive meaning of the 
explicit teachings of the last pronouncement is that very primordial mind 
[characterized by] the dependent being empty of the imaginary. They also 
explain that this [primordial mind] itself is taught by the truly perfect 
Buddha himself as the main topic of the middle pronouncement.49
The latter is articulated in the passage from the Seventeen Wondrous 
Answers: “[H]aving determined all relative truths as self-empty, one posits 
as remaining only the ultimate primordial mind (don dam pa’i ye shes).”50 
Shakya Chokden also says that this approach stems from the explicit 
teachings (dngos bstan) of the third dharmacakra and the Dharmas of 
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Maitreya interpreted by Asaثga and Vasubandhu.51 What is emphasized in 
either context is primordial mind, but in the former case Shakya Chokden 
unpacks the process of accessing that primordial mind, while in the latter 
he highlights the ultimate nature of primordial mind, which is empty of 
all relative, conventional phenomena.
The earlier statement that the imaginary is empty of its own entity 
while the dependent is empty of other entities should not be taken as 
contradicting the statement in the last passage that AlҮkčkčravčda asserts 
all relative truths or conventional phenomena as self-empty. This is because 
the former statement was made in the three natures context while the latter 
is made in the two natures context. In the former context the dependent 
had to be posited as the basis of emptiness whose entity is diϱerent from 
the object of negation. The second approach refers to the state in which 
all phenomena have been boiled down to the two truths—relative and 
ultimate—and the dependent has been split into the imaginary and thor-
oughly established that correspond to those truths. Were it possible to ϧnd 
the dependent apart from those two natures, the two approaches would 
be contradictory. But because such is not possible, the second statement 
does not imply that the dependent is self-empty. Rather, it presupposes 
that there is no dependent apart from the self-empty dualistic appearances 
(the imaginary) and the other-empty primordial mind (the thoroughly 
established).
Shakya Chokden’s interpretation of the AlҮkčkčravčda approach to 
other-emptiness can be summarized as follows. The dependent is comprised 
of two parts: the imaginary part of nonexistent dualistically appearing 
consciousness and the thoroughly established part of truly existent primor-
dial mind qualiϧed by clarity and cognition. The latter is the entity of the 
dependent but it does not overlap with it. The former does overlap with 
it but it is not its entity. In the process of negation of the imaginary the 
dependent evaporates too. After all, when one part of a pair is missing, 
the pair itself also should disappear. More speciϧcally, all that remains 
in the¬process of negation is the thoroughly established, which does not 
overlap with the dependent. The imaginary does overlap with it, but disap-
pears in the process of negation.
Shakya Chokden’s ϩuid approach to the two versions of other-emptiness 
clearly hinges on his understanding of the dependent. Two points in 
 particular—that the dependent is a conglomerate of the other two natures 
and that it disappears in the process of negation of the imaginary—are 
crucial for understanding why he ϧnds the two approaches to other-
emptiness to be noncontradictory. The two ways of dividing phenomena 
utilized in the two approaches are not contradictory because the dependent 
ultimately boils down to the other two natures.
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This boiling down happens not out of context but in the context of 
determining the view of other-emptiness by reasoning and subsequently 
realizing that view in contemplative practice culminating in the medita-
tive equipoise of čryas. The dependent’s composite and transitory status 
allows one to start with taking it as the basis of emptiness and negating 
the imaginary on its basis, but in the process letting the dependent go as 
well. When the part of dualistic appearances that is subsumed under the 
imaginary evaporates, all that is left as the remainder is the clarity and 
cognition part that is the thoroughly established. Thus, the three natures 
approach is indispensable at the beginning of this process while the two 
natures approach expresses its end result. The former is the prerequisite 
for the latter, while the latter is the outcome of the former. Each one has 
its place.
Before closing, I want to brieϩy address several elements found in 
seminal Indian Yogčcčra texts that can be seen as anticipating Shakya 
Chokden’s interpretive approach. Those elements pertain to (1) the close 
relationship between the three natures and the two truths, (2) diϱerent 
approaches to the three natures, (3) the unreality and destructibility of the 
dependent, (4) similes of the three natures, and (5) characteristics of the 
dependent outlined in the Summary of Mahčyčna.
1. The three natures theory shares common origins with that of the two 
truths. Elements of both can be found in the Prajñčpčramitč s࠭tras.52 The 
two truths and the three natures are likewise connected in such Yogčcčra 
texts as Maitreya’s Diϱerentiation of the Middle and Extremes (which pres-
ents only the thoroughly established as a ϧt candidate for the ultimate 
truth)53 and Maitreya’s Ornament of Mahčyčna S࠭tras54 with its commentary 
by Vasubandhu55 (which categorize the dependent together with the imagi-
nary as a phenomenal, conventional aspect of reality).56
Having formed both in response to—and as a further expansion of—the 
two truths theory,57 the three natures theory can be approached as its 
elaborate extension. Although the two theories have diϱerent emphases 
and perspectives—the three natures are more concerned with dynamic 
epistemological processes of conceiving unreality and realizing reality, 
while the two truths focus on ontology—they are not incompatible. As if 
folding and unfolding a fan, the former can be reduced to the latter and the 
latter expanded to the former. This feature no doubt contributed to Shakya 
Chokden’s claim of the lack of contradiction between the three natures 
model and the two natures model.
2. The philosophical focuses of the basic Yogčcčra texts appear to be 
diϱerent,58 and the three natures theory in particular is far from being 
clear-cut, having undergone extensive changes over time.59 Any one 
articulation of this theory is complicated by the fact that it was developed 
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by diϱerent authors with diverse philosophical outlooks during diϱerent 
historical periods.60
Similar to diϱerent models of the two truths, models of the three natures 
are far from being uniform, providing various interpretations of their 
relationship and identity. Alan Sponberg, for example, delineates three 
models of the three natures: the pivotal model that is based primarily 
on the second chapter of the Summary of Mahčyčna, the progressive 
model that came to be standard in the later East Asian tradition, and 
the model articulated by the Chinese thinker K’uei-chi that has parts of 
both of those models. The ϧrst model places emphasis on the dependent: 
while progressing on the path, one undergoes an epistemic shift from the 
imaginary to the thoroughly established (the two being understood as 
two mutually exclusive aspects of the dependent), but ontologically, the 
dependent is neither rejected nor, strictly speaking, transcended in the 
process. According to the second model, one ϧrst transcends or cuts oϱ 
the imaginary, but then also transcends or cuts oϱ the dependent, thereby 
ϧnally attaining the thoroughly established, which lies beyond the conven-
tional reality of the dependent.61
The ϧrst two models can be traced to Indian Yogčcčra texts. According 
to Klaus-Dieter Mathes, for example, Maitreya’s Diϱerentiation of the Middle 
and Extremes contains two models of the three natures that come close to 
Sponberg’s pivotal and progressive models.62 According to Mario D’Amato, 
the Ornament of Mahčyčna S࠭tras and its commentary by Vasubandhu 
propose the soteriologico-ontological model of the three natures that 
identiϧes stages of ontological gnosis traversed in the process of achieving 
buddhahood. One starts by moving from the level of the imaginary 
constructed by ordinary beings to the level of the dependent, where one 
realizes the nonexistence of conceptually constructed entities but accepts 
the conventional existence of an interdependent web of causes and condi-
tions that serve as their basis. Eventually, one reaches the level of the 
thoroughly established—buddhahood—where the basis of the matrix of 
conceptual construction has been abandoned.63
According to Sponberg, the progressive model stands in marked contrast 
to the approach of the Summary of Mahčyčna, because that text argues 
that there can be no thoroughly established without the existence of the 
dependent.64 Nevertheless, the Summary of Mahčyčna’s position does not 
necessarily have to be interpreted as indicating that the dependent should 
persist even when the thoroughly established has been fully realized. It can 
be understood as the dependent being indispensible only as a temporary 
basis of that realization. One can further argue that the text’s interpreta-
tion of the snake-rope-hemp simile (see below) in its third chapter also 
strongly suggests the progressive model of the three natures.
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Because seminal Yogčcčra texts allow for diϱerent interpretations of their 
positions on the three natures—as illustrated by the pivotal and progressive 
models—it is not surprising that later commentators attempted to stress 
their chosen models of the three natures over others, or to synthesize 
elements of diϱerent models. According to Sponberg, K’uei-chi utilized 
elements of both dynamic and progressive models by retaining the dynamic 
role of the dependent while shifting focus to the thoroughly established. As 
we have seen, Shakya Chokden in his own way attempted to reconcile two 
diϱerent models where the key role played by the dependent in realiza-
tion of reality is retained, but the emphasis is eventually shifted to the 
thoroughly established.
3. One of the main reasons why diϱerent models of the three natures 
are possible is the ambiguous status of the dependent. The widespread 
Yogčcčra position—accepted by Shakya Chokden as well—is that the 
dependent appears as the imaginary, while the thoroughly established is 
understood as the nonexistence of the dependent the way it appears—the 
nonexistence, that is, of the imaginary in the dependent. According to this 
scenario, the imaginary does not exist while the thoroughly established 
always exists. This state of aϱairs does not change regardless of whether 
or not the realization of the thoroughly established has been achieved and 
the appearance of the imaginary eliminated. The dependent, in contrast, 
performs many contradictory roles, and its existence is either admitted or 
negated depending on context.
The dependent serves as the basis of the emergence of dualistic 
 appearances—the imaginary. It likewise serves as the basis of realizing 
the nonexistence of the imaginary—realizing the thoroughly established. 
While its illusion-like status is admitted, in its role as this twofold basis the 
dependent is neither negated nor eliminated. It also continues to appear in 
the postmeditative state of subsequent attainment (rjes thob, pގ߅߮halabdha) 
even after the direct realization of reality has taken place. This being 
said, it is not destined to exist forever in this or any other role: it ceases 
or is transformed when the magic show of sa؃sčra is over and a buddha’s 
nirvčذa—the ultimate goal of the Mahčyčna path—has been achieved. It is 
this ϧnal transformation of the dependent—the last role it is to play—that 
brings about the resultant state of buddhahood.
From among these and other characteristics of the dependent, two 
ϧgure prominently in such seminal Yogčcčra texts as the S࠭tra Unraveling 
the Intent,65 Ornament of Mahčyčna S࠭tras (with its commentary by 
Vasubandhu), and Thirty Stanzas. The ϧrst is that the dependent does not 
have real existence and exists only as an illusion; the second is that upon 
its ϧnal transformation the dependent ceases to exist. According to the 
Ornament of Mahčyčna S࠭tras and its commentary by Vasubandhu, for 
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example, the dependent does not ultimately exist and is to be abandoned, 
destroyed through the knowledge of the three natures as they are.66 The 
Summary of Mahčyčna likens the dependent to a mirage, a reϩection, 
etc.67 The S࠭tra Unraveling the Intent, too, likens it to a phantom, magical 
creation, etc.,68 and argues that eventually it is to be eliminated.69
What these two features signify is that when all illusion-like states of 
mind have been eliminated and the ϧnal result of the path achieved, the 
dependent ceases and thereby becomes equal to the imaginary in terms of 
both of them being nonexistent. Only the thoroughly established persists 
forever: prior to buddhahood it exists as the state of nonexistence of the 
imaginary in the dependent, and afterward it exists also as the state free 
from both the imaginary and the dependent. These two features lend 
support to Shakya Chokden’s claim that the three natures can be reduced 
to the two natures, and that in the process of negation of the imaginary on 
the basis of the dependent, the dependent has to go too, and what remains 
after that negation is only the thoroughly established.
4. Although similes can illustrate actual things only to a limited extent 
and allow for diϱerent interpretations, three well-known similes of the 
three natures—the snake-rope-hemp, gold-ore, and magic show70—serve 
well to clarify the above-mentioned characteristics of the dependent and 
its relationship to the other two natures.
The ϧrst simile demonstrates that similar to a rope serving as a basis 
for a mistaken appearance of a snake and subsequent realization of the 
snake’s nonexistence in the rope, the dependent serves as the basis for 
appearance of the imaginary and subsequent realization of its nonexistence 
in the dependent. The simile further points out that what is “really out 
there” is not even the rope but only strands of hemp and other elements 
that comprise the rope, illustrating that in reality only the thoroughly 
established exists while the dependent does not.71 It thereby ϧrst demon-
strates the basal, pivotal role of the dependent, but then shifts emphasis 
to the perspective of the thoroughly established, in which the dependent 
has been transcended.
A similar mechanism is at play in the gold-ore simile used to illustrate the 
Summary of Mahčyčna’s statement that the dependent is comprised of two 
parts: the imaginary and the thoroughly established. The gold-bearing ore 
(the dependent) initially appears simply as clay (the imaginary), but when 
it has been burned with ϧre (nonconceptual realization of ultimate reality), 
gold (the thoroughly established) appears and clay disappears. Here too we 
can see the emphasis on the basal, pivotal role of the dependent illustrated 
by the ore appearing ϧrst as clay and then as gold. But note the dynamics at 
play here: similar to the gold-ore that appears as mere clay, the dependent 
appears as the imaginary. Yet, when the clay has been burned down, all 
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that remains is not even the ore but only pure gold. Likewise, when the 
dependent has been burned with the ϧre of nonconceptual wisdom, all that 
remains is the thoroughly established.72 Thus, while indicating the pivotal 
role of the dependent, this simile also demonstrates that after the pivoting 
has taken place, the pivot—the dependent—itself disappears.
In the magic show simile, the appearance of the magically created 
elephant stands for the dependent, the magically created elephant itself 
stands for the imaginary, and the wood, etc. stand for the thoroughly 
established.73 Here, the basal role of the dependent is limited only to its 
projecting the imaginary, and from the start the emphasis is put on the thor-
oughly established that serves as the basis of both the dependent and the 
imaginary. Similar to a magically created elephant and its appearance, these 
two natures arise together and disappear together, while the thoroughly 
established, similar to pieces of wood, pebbles, etc., persists throughout.74
All three similes can be interpreted as illustrating the unreality of the 
dependent and its destructibility, and the gold-ore simile in particular 
demonstrates the composite character of the dependent that plays the key 
role in Shakya Chokden’s approach to the three natures.
5. Because Shakya Chokden believes that his interpretation of the 
 dependent as a composite of the other two natures is supported by 
Asaثga’s Summary of Mahčyčna, it is worth taking a closer look at that 
text’s  perspectives on the dependent. According to Noritoshi Aramaki, 
these perspectives can be summarized in nine categories: (1) the 
basis of appearance of all phenomena (sarvadharmapratibhčsč޿raya), 
(2) dependent origination (prat Үtyasamutpčda), (3) mere cognizance 
(vijñaptimčtratč), (4)¬neither diϱerent nor non-diϱerent [from the other 
two natures] (na bhinno nčpy abhinnaь), (5) like magical illusion, etc. 
(mčyčdivat), (6) pertaining to aϮictions and pertaining to puriϧcation 
(sa؃kle޿č؃޿iko vyavadčnč؃޿ika޿ ca), (7) the object known in subsequent 
attainment (čla؃bana؃ pގ߅߮halabdha jñčnasya), (8) nonabiding nirvčذa 
(aprati߅߮hitanirvčذa), and (9) dharma-body (dharmakčya).75 (As is clear from 
the list, most of these categories characterize the dependent itself while 
others are only related to it.)76
The nine categories demonstrate characteristics of the dependent in 
general, and in particular the ones emphasized in this paper. Category 1 
refers to the dependent in terms of its general function as a basis of mani-
festing phenomenal appearances, while category 2 refers to its character of 
dependent origination. Category 3 refers to the mental “stuϱ” it is made of, 
category 4 refers to its close and interdependent relationship with the other 
two natures, and category 5 refers to the fact that it is unreal and illusory. 
Category 6 refers to its being comprised of the contradictory elements of 
aϮictions and their puriϧcation. Category 7 refers to it as an object of mind 
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that arises subsequent to the direct realization of reality. Category 8 refers 
to it as a composite of the imaginary and thoroughly established natures 
and uses this as the reason for the Buddha teaching the inseparability of 
sa؃sčra and nirvčذa. And category 9 refers to its ϧnal transformation as a 
result of the path—the state where the dependent belonging to the aϮicted 
part has been eliminated and the dependent belonging to the puriϧed part 
has been assumed.
Categories 1–5 and 7 hardly require additional comment. As for catego-
ries 6, 8, and 9, together they demonstrate an important feature of the 
dependent: while being a composite of the other two natures, it will not 
last in this role forever, because eventually its aϮicted, sa؃sčric part will 
be destroyed, and only the puriϧed, nirvčذic part retained.77 As we already 
know, according to the Summary of Mahčyčna, the puriϧed part of the 
dependent is the thoroughly established.
Embedded in the interconnected web of Yogčcčra ideas, these ϧve 
elements (1–5) provided a fertile ground for the ϩuid approach to the three 
natures developed by Shakya Chokden. To recapitulate, this approach was 
anticipated by the possibility of reducing the three natures to the two 
truths/natures, the lack of real existence of the dependent, the composite 
character of the dependent, the destructibility of the dependent, and the 
eventual shift of emphasis to the thoroughly established as a result of 
progress on the path. Although Shakya Chokden worked in a historical, 
social, and philosophical milieu very diϱerent from that of the authors 
of the Yogčcčra works mentioned above, and although his is only one 
among many possible interpretations of the three natures and related ideas 
contained in those works, in his interpretive approach he clearly built upon, 
responded to, and further articulated those ideas.
Notes
1. Hereafter, I am using the simpliϧed phonetic transcription of Tibetan based 
on the usage adopted by the Tibetan and Himalayan Library. For details, see 
http://www.thlib.org/reference/transliteration.
2. I focus on this unique approach to the two systems in my Visions of Unity: 
The Golden Paذʼita Shakya Chokden’s New Interpretation of Yogčcčra and 
Madhyamaka (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011). Hereafter, 
Visions of Unity.
3. These issues are discussed in chapter 2 section 4 of the Visions of Unity.
4. For details, see Visions of Unity, chapter 4 section 1.
5. For further reasons see the last two sections of chapter 3 of the Visions of Unity. 
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57. Sponberg, “The Trisvabhčva Doctrine in India and China,” 97.
58. John P. Keenan, “Original Purity and the Focus of Early Yogčcčra,” Journal of 
the International Association of Buddhist Studies 5, no. 1 (1982): 7.
59. Ronald M. Davidson, “Buddhist Systems of Transformation: ǳ޿raya parivގtti/
parčvގtti among the Yogčcčra” (PhD Dissertation, University of California, 
Berkeley, 1985), 228.
60. Sponberg, “The Trisvabhčva Doctrine in India and China,” 98.
61. Ibid., 101–102.
62. See Mathes, “Tčrančtha’s Presentation of trisvabhčva in the gংan stoث sñiث po,” 
200, especially 211–12.
63. D’Amato, “Three Natures, Three Stages,” 203–204.
64. “The Trisvabhčva Doctrine in India and China,” 102, 116 note 11.
65. ǳryasa؃dhinirmocanančmamahčyčnas࠭tra, ’Phags pa dgongs pa nges par ’ grel 
pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo, D0106, mdo sde, ca, 1b–55b. English 
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translation in John Powers, Wisdom of Buddha: The Sa׿dhinirmocana S࠭tra 
(Berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 1995); also a selected translation in Lin, “‘The 
Sa؃dhinirmocana S࠭tra’: A Liberating Hermeneutic,” 182–300.
66. D’Amato, “Three Natures, Three Stages,” 197, 200. According to Keenan, the 
S࠭tra Unraveling the Intent and the Ornament of Mahčyčna S࠭tras parallel each 
other in their explanation of the three natures, although their focuses are 
diϱerent (“Original Purity and the Focus of Early Yogčcčra,” 10). While oϱering 
diϱerent perspectives on the dependent, they agree on two important points: 
that its function is to account for the delusions of the imaginary and that it is 
destroyed through wisdom (ibid., 11).
67. Summary of Mahčyčna, 19a ϱ.
68. Lin, “‘The Sa؃dhinirmocana S࠭tra’: A Liberating Hermeneutic,” 153–54.
69. Ibid., 156 note 19, 232. Powers, Wisdom of Buddha, 111.
70. Both the ϧrst and second similes are found in the Summary of Mahčyčna. 
The magic show simile is found in numerous texts, including the Ornament of 
Mahčyčna S࠭tras. See discussions in Gadjin M. Nagao, “The Buddhist World 
View as Elucidated in the Three-Nature Theory and its Similes,” in Gadjin 
Nagao, Mčdhyamika and Yogčcčra: A Study of Mahčyčna Philosophies, ed. and 
trans. Leslie Kawamura (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 67.
71. For details see Summary of Mahčyčna, 24b–25a. Also, see discussion in Nagao, 
“The Buddhist World View,” 67. This simile can be approached slightly diϱer-
ently. Sponberg, for example, cites K’uei-chi as arguing that the progression 
from rope to its constituents demonstrates that the notion of the dependent 
is to be abandoned—not the dependent itself (“The Trisvabhčva Doctrine in 
India and China,” 107).
72. Summary of Mahčyčna, 19b–20a. Also, see Nagao, “The Buddhist World 
View,”¬68.
73. This simile too can be approached diϱerently. According to Nagao, the wood, 
etc. stand for both the dependent and the thoroughly established. Mčdhyamika 
and Yogčcčra, 69.
74. Arguably, the magic show simile eventually supplanted the crystal simile 
found in such texts as the S࠭tra Unraveling the Intent (Davidson, “Buddhist 
Systems of Transformation,” 91). In that simile, the dependent is likened to a 
transparent crystal that assumes diϱerent colors when contacting diϱerent 
dyestuϱ, the imaginary is likened to the crystal’s appearance as diϱerent 
jewels, and the thoroughly established is likened to the lack of reality of the 
latter constructed upon the former (Lin, “‘The Sa؃dhinirmocana S࠭tra’: A 
Liberating Hermeneutic,” 141–42, 219–20; Powers, Wisdom of Buddha, 85–87). This 
can be taken to imply that the dependent remains even after the appearances 
of the imaginary have ceased, and that it is no diϱerent from the thoroughly 
established when no such appearances are present. Yet, as has been mentioned 
above, the same s࠭tra argues that the dependent is eventually to be eliminated. 
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This is further suggested by the clouded vision simile discussed in the s࠭tra 
immediately before the crystal simile. There, the imaginary is likened to the 
defects of clouded vision, the dependent is likened to mistaken appearances of 
hairs, etc., and the thoroughly established is likened to what is naturally seen 
by a person whose eyes are free from the defects of clouded vision (Lin, “‘The 
Sa؃dhinirmocana S࠭tra’: A Liberating Hermeneutic,” 218–19; Powers, Wisdom 
of Buddha, 83). That simile thereby also suggests the eventual destruction of 
the dependent, together with the imaginary, when the complete realization of 
the thoroughly established has been achieved.
75. Noritoshi, Aramaki, “Paratantrasvabhčva—A Diagrammatic Account,” Journal 
of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyڟgaku Kenky࠭) 30–32 (1967–68): 
41. I have retained the Sanskrit but changed the translation.
76. In the article, Aramaki describes these categories as the “nine meanings of 
the paratantrasvabhčva.” But as is clear from their detailed discussion in his 
“Shڟdaijڟron no Etakishڟ” (Dependent Nature according to the Summary of 
Mahčyčna), Miscellanes Indologica Kiotiensia (Indogaku Shironsh࠭), nos. 4–5 
(1963): 39, not all of those categories refer to the dependent proper.
77. One might argue that category 9 indicates that the dependent—now in its 
puriϧed form—exists even after the dharma-body has been achieved, thereby 
supporting the claim of the existence of the pure dependent rejected by Shakya 
Chokden. This argument is strongly suggested by such passages as, “What the 
transformation is is the abandonment of the thoroughly aϮicted part and 
the turning into the puriϧed part when the antidote of that very dependent 
nature has been generated” (gzhan gyur ba ni gang gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo 
nyid de nyid kyi gnyen po skyes na gang kun nas nyon mongs pa’i cha ldog cing 
rnam par byang ba’i char gyur pa’o; Summary of Mahčyčna, 36b) and “The 
characteristic of the change of state is the turning into the dependent nature 
that belongs to the puriϧed part, free from all obscurations, and has power 
over all phenomena when the dependent nature that belongs to the thoroughly 
aϮicted part possessing all obscurations has been turned away (gnas gyur pa’i 
mtshan nyid ni sgrib pa thams cad pa kun nas nyon mongs pa’i char gtogs pa’i 
gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid rnam par log na sgrib pa thams cad las rnam par 
grol zhing chos thams cad la dbang sgyur ba nye bar gnas pa rnam par byang 
ba’i char gtogs pa gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid du gyur pa’i phyir ro; ibid., 
37b). Nevertheless, one should note that the Summary of Mahčyčna refers to 
the dependent nature as follows: “What is the dependent’s characteristic? It is 
the cognizance subsumed under the unreal ideation possessing the seed of the 
storehouse consciousness (gzhan gyi dbang gi msthan nyid gang zhe na // gang 
kun gzhi rnam par shes pa’i sa bon can yang dag pa ma yin pa kun rtog pas bsdus 
pa’i rnam par rig pa’o. Ibid., 13a). Because the unreal ideation in general, and 
the storehouse consciousness with its seeds in particular, are eliminated in the 
state of buddhahood, the same should apply to the dependent. Note too that 
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the ϧrst passage cited in this footnote mentions generation of the antidote of 
the dependent, thereby also presupposing its eventual destruction. Based on 
the composite character of the dependent and its eventual destructibility, one 
can argue that the puriϧed dependent is no more the dependent than a dead 
human is a human. (Whether a dead human [shi ba’i mi] is a human [mi] is a 
fun debate topic used by beginner debaters in Tibetan monastic institutions.) 
According to Buddhism, a human is comprised of, among other things, the 
physical body and consciousness. Because at death consciousness leaves the 
body, a dead human is not, properly speaking, a human. In a similar vein, 
because, according to the Summary of Mahčyčna, the dependent consists of 
both aϮicted and puriϧed elements, sa؃sčric and nirvčذic elements, etc., and 
because at the ϧnal transformation its aϮicted, sa؃sčric, imaginary elements 
cease, the transformed dependent is not, properly speaking, the dependent.
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